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2107 
TO WITHDRAW OR NOT TO WITHDRAW: 
REVIEWABILITY OF AN AGENCY’S WITHDRAWN 
PROPOSED RULE 
 
Jane E. Carmody* 
Abstract: Federal agencies propose thousands of regulations in any given year. The 
Administrative Procedure Act requires such agencies to follow certain procedures when 
enacting rules and regulations. However, when an agency proposes a new rule that is purely 
discretionary—not mandated by Congress—it may withdraw the proposed rule at any point 
before the rule is finalized. In October 2017, the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) 
withdrew a proposed rule that, if enacted, would have required long-term care facilities to 
recognize out of state same-sex marriages as a condition of Medicare and Medicaid 
participation. In its formal withdrawal published in the Federal Register, CMS reasoned that 
the proposed rule was no longer necessary due to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges. 
This Comment examines the circumstances under which a district court can review an 
agency’s withdrawal of a discretionary proposed rule. For nearly forty years, the D.C. Circuit 
has held that withdrawn discretionary rules may be ripe for judicial review if two requirements 
are met: (1) the withdrawal signals final agency action and (2) the agency created an adequate 
and precise record pursuant to informal notice-and-comment rulemaking. However, some 
commentators, notably former Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, argue that an agency’s 
decision to withdraw a proposed rule is wholly discretionary and thus unreviewable in light of 
the U.S. Supreme Court decision Heckler v. Chaney. 
This Comment concludes by arguing that judicial review of withdrawn discretionary 
proposed rules is necessary to prevent arbitrary and capricious agency action. Moreover, 
despite Judge Kozinski’s concerns, arbitrary and capricious review supplies a reviewing court 
with the critical tools to review withdrawn discretionary rules. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, not all states allowed same-sex couples to marry. Later that 
year, however, the fight for marriage equality gained a historic victory. In 
United States v. Windsor,1 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) as unconstitutional.2 Under section 3 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. I would like to thank 
Professor Sanne Knudsen for her insightful comments and guidance throughout the drafting process. 
I would also like to thank the exceptional Washington Law Review editors whose edits and thoughtful 
comments helped me improve this piece. Any errors are my own. 
1. 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
2. Id. at 774–75. 
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of DOMA, the federal government actively defined marriage as “a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”3 The Court 
held that this provision violated the Fifth Amendment’s promise of Due 
Process.4 Thus, the federal government could no longer determine the 
validity of a couple’s marriage based upon the sex of the spouses. The 
holding of Windsor, however, did not prevent states from banning same-
sex marriages.5 
On December 12, 2014, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
(CMS),6 published a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal 
Register.7 The proposed rule, an action of the Obama Administration, 
sought to ensure that skilled nursing facilities, also referred to as long-
term care facilities, complied with the holding in Windsor.8 Long-term 
care facilities provide “skilled nursing care and related services for 
residents who require medical or nursing care, or rehabilitation services 
for the rehabilitation of injured, disabled, or sick persons.”9 CMS requires 
long-term care facilities to comply with conditions of participation in 
order to receive Medicare and Medicaid funding.10 
In light of the Windsor decision, the Obama Administration’s proposed 
CMS rule sought to add additional requirements for participation in the 
federal Medicare program. These requirements ensured “equal treatment 
to spouses, regardless of their sex.”11 This included recognizing the 
marriages of same-sex couples even if the state in which the facility was 
located did not allow same-sex couples to marry.12 At the time, the 
                                                     
3. Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. 3396, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996); see 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) invalidated 
by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Windsor, 570 U.S. at 751. 
4. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 774–76; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person 
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). 
5. See Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/9E93-
G5XH]. 
6. CMS is the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) responsible 
for administering U.S. healthcare programs. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/About-CMS.html [https://perma.cc/NQV9-9AFX]. 
7. Medicare and Medicaid Program; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions of 
Participation and Conditions for Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,873 (proposed Dec. 12, 2014) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 416, 418, 482, 483, and 485). 
8. Id.; Windsor, 570 U.S. at 772 (finding that “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of 
state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal,” thus violating the Fifth Amendment). 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).  
10. 42 C.F.R. § 483.1(a)–(b) (2018). 
11. Medicare and Medicaid Program; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions of 
Participation and Conditions for Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. at 73,874. 
12. Id. 
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Medicare participation requirements deferred to state law regarding the 
definition of marriage.13 The proposed rule would have ensured that 
same-sex spouses were “recognized and afforded equal rights in certain 
Medicare and Medicaid-participating facilities.”14 Under the proposed 
rule, facilities could no longer defer to state law regarding marriage and 
receive federal support.15 
The proposed CMS rule, however, never took effect.16 On October 4, 
2017, after the change in presidential administration, CMS formally 
withdrew the proposed rule.17 The agency cited one reason for the 
withdrawal—the 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision Obergefell v. 
Hodges.18 
In Obergefell, the Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protected a person’s fundamental right to marriage.19 The majority in 
Obergefell held that states could no longer prohibit same-sex couples from 
getting married—effectively legalizing same-sex marriage in all fifty 
states.20 Because of this ruling, CMS reasoned that Obergefell “requires a 
state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex, and to 
recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed in other States.”21 CMS 
therefore, withdrew the proposed rule because Obergefell “addresse[s] 
many of the concerns raised in the December 2014 proposed rule.”22 Thus, 
CMS believed the proposed rule was redundant. 
The withdrawal of the proposed CMS rule by the Trump 
Administration is not unconventional. New presidential administrations 
often clean house of unwanted regulatory structures.23 Withdrawn 
                                                     
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions for 
Participation and Conditions for Coverage; Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,181 (withdrawn Oct. 4, 
2017). 
17. Id. 
18. Id.; 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
19. 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03. 
20. Id. at 2604–05. 
21. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions for 
Participation and Conditions for Coverage; Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. at 46,181. 
22. Id. 
23. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 
4435 (Jan. 26, 2009), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-01-26/pdf/E9-1639.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2MWX-VCTQ] (On January 20, 2009, the Obama Administration sent a 
memorandum ordering department heads to “[w]ithdraw from the OFR all proposed or final 
regulations that have not been published in the Federal Register so that they can be reviewed and 
approved by a department or agency head.”); Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of 
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proposed rules, however, highlight a unique area of administrative law. 
Should courts be able to review agency actions that are wholly 
discretionary? If yes, then under what standard? How much deference 
should be given to agencies for deciding to withdrawal a proposed rule? 
When an agency engages in rulemaking, several legal mechanisms 
within the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) operate to ensure sound 
agency decision-making. For example, the APA requires an agency to: 
(1) support its findings with factual evidence;24 (2) act within its relevant 
constitutional and statutory authority;25 and (3) act in a manner that is not 
“arbitrary” or “capricious.”26 The APA also provides several judicial 
review provisions that enable courts to review agency decision-making.27 
For example, not every agency decision is judicially reviewable—the 
APA only allows courts to review “final agency action.”28 This includes 
both affirmative action by an agency and also an agency’s “failure to 
act.”29 Because of this requirement, courts cannot review agency decisions 
that are “committed to agency discretion by law.”30 
Withdrawn discretionary proposed rules, however, do not easily fit into 
the categories of agency action or inaction, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
has yet to weigh in on the appropriate categorization for these actions 
under the APA. Thus, even though CMS invested significant time and 
resources into the proposed rule, there is a possibility that the action of 
withdrawing the proposed rule is not judicially reviewable under the APA. 
Without judicial review, an agency could pull the plug on a proposed 
rule’s progress with little to no accountability.31 
This Comment uses the Obama Administration’s proposed CMS rule 
and the Trump Administration’s subsequent withdrawal to discuss the 
reviewability of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules. Focusing on the 
withdrawn proposed CMS rule as a case study, this Comment argues that 
                                                     
Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-01-24/pdf/01-2368.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S3A-VGKR] 
(On January 20, 2001, the Bush Administration sent a similar memorandum to department heads that 
they should “send no proposed or final regulation to the Office of the Federal Register (the ‘OFR’) 
unless and until a department or agency head appointed by the President after noon on January 20, 
2001, reviews and approves the regulatory action”).  
24. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012). 
25. Id. § 706(2)(B)–(C). 
26. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
27. Id. §§ 701–06; see Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative 
Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 464 (2008). 
28. 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
29. Id. § 551(13).  
30. Id. § 701(a). 
31. See id. § 553. 
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judicial review of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules is both 
appropriate and necessary to prevent agency abuse of power. 
Furthermore, judicial review of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules 
forces agencies to engage in non-arbitrary decision-making. 
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the 
administrative rulemaking process and how withdrawn discretionary 
proposed rules fit into the APA’s framework. It then outlines the APA’s 
judicial review provisions and the requirements to challenge agency 
action. Part II describes the regulatory history of the Obama 
Administration’s discretionary proposed rule. It then discusses the 
particulars of the proposed CMS rule and the added protections the rule 
would have given LGBT older adults. Furthermore, Part II describes the 
protections, if any, Obergefell provides to LGBT older adults. Part III 
sketches the progression of judicial review of withdrawn discretionary 
proposed rules and the lens through which courts review the agency’s 
reasoning behind such withdrawals. It then outlines both the prevailing 
view of the D.C. Circuit and Judge Kozinski’s dissenting viewpoint on 
judicial review. Lastly, Part IV argues that review of withdrawn 
discretionary proposed rules is an appropriate exercise of judicial power 
under the APA to ensure non-arbitrary agency decision-making. 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING AND WITHDRAWN 
RULES 
Through rulemaking, federal agencies have an immense impact on a 
wide array of national policies.32 The rulemaking process generally begins 
with an act of Congress granting rulemaking authority to an agency, which 
allows the agency to then implement rules to effectuate the purpose and 
goals of the statute.33 On average, federal agencies “issue more than 3,000 
final rules each year” on a variety of topics.34 In comparison, the 115th 
Congress passed just ninety-seven laws—including seventy-four bills and 
twenty-three joint-resolutions.35 
                                                     
32. Jonathan Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, WASH. POST (May 24, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-of-government 
/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html?utm_term=.ac47aaff72db 
[https://perma.cc/G9TY-JZ5R]. 
33. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32240, THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING PROCESS: 
AN OVERVIEW 1 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32240.pdf [https://perma.cc/25ML-GDJ5].  
34. Id. 
35. Danny Vink, What Congress Actually Did in 2017, POLITICO (Dec. 26, 2017, 3:06 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/12/26/congresss-secret-achievements-000604 
[https://perma.cc/4YNY-RX38]. 
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Despite this vast and expanding power, courts are constrained in 
reviewing some agency actions under the APA.36 Withdrawn 
discretionary proposed rules, like the proposed CMS rule, occupy a 
unique space within administrative law. Withdrawn discretionary 
proposed rules do not necessarily represent agency action or inaction—
raising the question of whether judicial review is proper.37 Furthermore, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has remained silent on whether withdrawn 
discretionary proposed rules are judicially reviewable.38 The D.C. Circuit, 
however, has ruled in the affirmative, holding that withdrawn 
discretionary proposed rules are in fact subject to judicial review.39 
This Part discusses the mechanics and history of the reviewability of 
withdrawn discretionary proposed rules. It begins by summarizing the 
administrative rulemaking process. Next it explores the various hurdles in 
challenging this type of discretionary agency action. Finally, this Part 
surveys the D.C. Circuit’s application of the arbitrary and capricious 
review standard to an agency’s reasoning for withdrawing proposed rules. 
A. The APA Sets Forth Requirements for the Rulemaking Process 
Before a rule is proposed, withdrawn, finalized, or even challenged, an 
agency must comply with certain formalities.40 Virtually all agency 
rulemaking goes through the informal rulemaking process, as opposed to 
                                                     
36. See Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 
689, 693–702 (1990) (“The APA’s judicial review chapter provides that agency action is normally 
subject to review, but also states in section 701(a) that the chapter ‘does not apply to the extent that 
(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.’ 
The first of the two numbered clauses does not create interpretation difficulties (although there may 
be uncertainty as to whether a given statute actually precludes review). The cryptic language of the 
second clause, however, has generated tremendous confusion.”). 
37. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency 
in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1188 (2009). 
38. Id. at 1190. 
39. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“[I]n light of 
the strong presumption of reviewability, discretionary decisions not to adopt rules are reviewable 
where, as here, the agency has in fact held a rulemaking proceeding and compiled a record narrowly 
focused on the particular rules suggested but not adopted.”). Some scholars note that the D.C. Circuit 
is “the second most important court” in the United States because of its unique position in reviewing 
the bulk of agency actions. Aaron Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review – Reviewed: The Second Most 
Important Court?, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 4, 2015), http://yalejreg.com/nc/d-
c-circuit-review-reviewed-the-second-most-important-court-by-aaron-nielson/ 
[https://perma.cc/PPH7-AP2Y]. 
40. Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
856, 856 (2007).  
17 - Carmody.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2018  4:31 PM 
2018] REVIEWING WITHDRAWN PROPOSED RULES 2113 
 
formal rulemaking.41 When an agency engages in informal rulemaking it 
must comply with the requirements of section 553 of the APA.42 Even 
though this section of the APA does not define rulemaking, it imposes 
three constraints on agencies seeking to adopt a final rule.43 First, a 
“[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making [must] be published in the 
Federal Register.”44 The notice of proposed rulemaking only needs to 
include “the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of 
the subjects and issues involved.”45 Next, the agency must allow for an 
open comment period so that the general public has “an opportunity to 
participate in the rule making” process.46 This can be by “written data, 
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”47 
Lastly, the agency “shall incorporate” a “concise general statement of [the 
rule’s] basis and purpose.”48 This overall framework is often referred to 
as “notice-and-comment” rulemaking and only applies to legislative 
rules.49 Legislative rules “create rights, impose obligations, or effect 
change in existing law pursuant to authority delegated by Congress.”50 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is not needed for “interpretative rules, 
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, 
or practice.”51 
Once the public has had an opportunity to comment, an agency can 
move forward in finalizing the rule or issuing a new or modified version 
for additional notice-and-comment consideration.52 At this stage, an 
agency may also decide to abandon the proposed rule, as CMS did with 
                                                     
41. Id.; see United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 236–38 (1973) (holding that formal 
rulemaking is only required if the organic act states that rulemaking must take place “on the record”). 
42. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
43. Id. These three requirements do not apply to “interpretive rules, general statements of policy, 
or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” Id. Those types of agency rules are beyond 
the scope of this Comment. 
44. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
45. Id. § 553(b)(3). 
46. Id. § 553(c). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Beermann & Lawson, supra note 40, at 856 (citations omitted). 
50. L.A. Closeout, Inc. v. DHS, 513 F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. 
DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003)); see 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).  
51. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
52. ERULEMAKING PROGRAM MGMT. OFFICE, EPA, REGULATORY TIMELINE, 
https://www.regulations.gov/docs/FactSheet_Regulatory_Timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6NQ-
9KNS]. 
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the 2014 proposed rule.53 Regardless of whether an agency decides to 
formally adopt a proposed rule or withdraw a proposed rule, it must 
explain why it is taking such action.54 
B. A Reviewing Court Must Comply with the APA’s Limitations on 
Judicial Review 
The APA specifies the appropriate standard of review for an agency’s 
decision to act or not to act.55 Under the APA, an agency’s action must be 
“final” before a reviewing court can assess the agency’s reasoning.56 A 
two-part test determines when an agency action is “final.”57 First, the 
action must symbolize the end of the agency’s decision-making process.58 
Second, the action must be one in which “rights and obligations” have 
been determined or from which “legal consequences flow.”59 For 
example, when an agency engages in notice-and-comment rulemaking 
and ultimately promulgates a rule subject to the procedures of section 553 
of the APA, it constitutes final agency action, which is subject to judicial 
review.60 
Even though the final promulgation of a rule easily satisfies the 
two-part finality test, agency inaction may also—in limited situations—
satisfy the finality requirement.61 In the case of inaction, an agency has 
not started the rulemaking process and the status quo remains 
unchanged.62 Thus, a proper challenge to agency inaction is allowed only 
under exceedingly narrow circumstances. For example, a court may 
review agency inaction if an agency is “compelled by law to act within a 
certain time period, but the manner of its action is left to the agency’s 
                                                     
53. Envtl. Integrity Project v. McCarthy, 139 F. Supp. 3d 25, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
54. Beermann & Lawson, supra note 40, at 880 (explaining that after the comment period, the 
agency must “articulate explicitly all of the key issues of fact, law, and policy raised” during the 
notice-and-comment period). 
55. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (governing judicial review of agency actions in the absence of a governing 
statute’s specific reviewing structure). 
56. Id. § 704; Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796–97 (1992). 
57. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
61. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1187–88. 
62. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (holding that failure to act by an 
agency “is simply the omission of an action without formally rejecting a request—for example, the 
failure to promulgate a rule or take some decision by a statutory deadline”).  
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discretion” and the agency fails to act.63 In this situation, a court could 
“compel” the agency to act because its inaction was “unlawfully withheld 
or unreasonably delayed.”64 Therefore, withdrawn rules could be 
categorized as final agency action, but that is not always the case.65 
The text of the APA excludes judicial review in two instances.66 First, 
if the agency’s governing statute explicitly “precludes judicial review,” 
then courts are prohibited from reviewing the agency’s action.67 Second, 
the APA prohibits courts from reviewing an agency action if the action 
“is committed to agency discretion by law.”68 Despite this bright line 
designation, the U.S. Supreme Court has nevertheless indicated that 
Congressional intent surrounding the judicial review provisions of the 
APA indicate that they “must be given ‘hospitable’ interpretation.”69 The 
Court further stated that “[t]he legislative material elucidating that 
seminal act manifests a congressional intention that it cover a broad 
spectrum of administrative actions.”70 Congressional legislative history 
also indicates that the APA should apply to a broad range of agency 
action: 
To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific 
in withholding such review, must upon its face give clear and 
convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure 
to provide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no 
evidence of intent to withhold review.71 
                                                     
63. Id. at 65. 
64. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 
65. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1194. 
66. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). 
67. Id.; see Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967), abrogated on other grounds, 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) (“[O]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ 
of a contrary legislative intent should courts restrict access to judicial review.” (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 
369 U.S. 367 (1962))). 
68. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); see Berry v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 832 F.3d 627, 634 (6th Cir. 2016) (“The 
phrase ‘committed to agency discretion by law’ is a term of art in administrative law, representing ‘a 
very narrow exception’ to judicial review for two particular types of discretionary agency action.” 
(quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971))). 
69. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140–41; see, e.g., Duncan v. Muzyn, 833 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 
2016) (“Reviewability is the norm. Courts strongly presume the reviewability of agency action.”); 
Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 718 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In general, there is a ‘strong 
presumption that Congress intends judicial review of agency action.’” (quoting Helgeson v. Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, 153 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1988))). 
70. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140. 
71. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 275 (1946). 
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C. Withdrawn Discretionary Proposed Rules Fall in the Middle of the 
Rulemaking Process 
Withdrawn proposed rules exist in a space between final agency action 
and agency inaction.72 A withdrawn proposed rule represents an agency’s 
decision to begin the rulemaking process, but it also represents an 
incomplete rulemaking process.73 Generally, withdrawn rules can be 
divided into three broad categories.74 The first two categories are 
judicially reviewable.75 First, some statutes explicitly address agency 
decisions to withdraw a proposed rule.76 For example, several 
environmental statues, such as the Endangered Species Act,77 account for 
this type of agency action. Under the Endangered Species Act, when the 
agency seeks to list a particular species, pursuant to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, it has three options: (1) conclude within one year that the 
species is endangered and then list the species, (2) conclude that the 
particular species is not endangered and withdraw the listing, and 
(3) extend the potential listing by six months if there is scientific 
disagreement about the potential endangerment.78 However, if the agency 
ultimately decides to withdraw the listing because the species is not 
endangered, that action can be challenged.79 Most statutes, however, “do 
not explicitly contemplate the abandonment of proposed rulemakings.”80 
Second, “even if the statutory scheme does not explicitly contemplate” an 
agency withdrawal, “courts will often review agency decisions to abandon 
proposed action if the applicable statute imposes mandatory obligations 
on the agency to act.”81 Third, if Congress delegated rulemaking authority 
to an agency without delineating specific action, an agency has the 
                                                     
72. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1188. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 1188–89. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 1188. 
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6) (2012). The Clean Air Act is another example of when a statutory 
scheme explicitly contemplates a withdrawn proposed rule. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2)–(3) (2012). 
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6). 
79. See, e.g., Tucson Herpetological Soc. v. Salazar, 566 F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 2009) (Plaintiffs 
“contend that the Secretary of the Interior’s (the ‘Secretary’) decision to withdraw a rule proposing 
that the flat-tailed horned lizard (the ‘lizard’) be listed as a threatened species is contrary to the 
requirements of the Endangered Species Act”); Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d 739, 741 
(W.D. Tex. 1997) (challenging the Secretary of the Interior’s “decision to withdraw the proposed 
listing of the Barton Springs salamander (Eurycea sosorum)”). 
80. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1189. 
81. Id. 
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discretion to propose and withdraw rules to effectuate the intent of 
Congress.82 Less consensus exists around the reviewability of the third 
category of withdrawn rules because these actions represent wholly 
discretionary agency decision-making and the U.S. Supreme Court has yet 
to weigh in. 
II. THE REGULATORY HISTORY OF THE 2014 CMS 
WITHDRAWN DISCRETIONARY PROPOSED RULE 
This Part explores CMS’s 2014 proposed rule and its subsequent 
formal withdrawal in the Federal Register. In doing so, this Part highlights 
what protections the rule would have provided the growing population of 
LGBT older adults in long-term care facilities. Over the next fifteen years, 
the nation’s senior population is expected to grow at an unprecedented 
rate.83 As this segment of the population continues to increase, the reliance 
on long-term care facilities will also rise because many older adults do not 
have the necessary savings to continue to live independently or pay for an 
in-home nursing aide.84 
All adults, especially LGBT older adults, need spaces that are 
conducive to aging successfully.85 However, affordable housing for older 
adults is lacking overall, let alone LGBT-inclusive housing.86 Current 
LGBT older adults need inclusive spaces that embrace their identity 
because of the systemic and historical discrimination against those 
individuals over the last several decades.87 Without federal protections for 
LGBT people in long-term care facilities, LGBT older adults often face 
discrimination in those settings.88 
                                                     
82. See generally OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (2011), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2DE4-E2DL]. 
83. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., HEALTHY AGING BEGINS AT HOME 7 (2016), 
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/BPC-Healthy-Aging.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4JG9-526R]. 
84. Id. Medicare Part A covers skilled nursing care facilities, including meals, a shared room, 
medications, physical therapy, and other services. See Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) Care, U.S. 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/skilled-nursing-
facility-care.html [https://perma.cc/E4UH-HADE].  
85. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & SAGE, UNDERSTANDING ISSUES FACING LGBT 
OLDER ADULTS 7 (2017), https://www.lgbtmap.org/file/understanding-issues-facing-lgbt-older-
adults.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WNS-B95J]. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Although the topic is largely outside the scope of this Comment, the Nursing Home Reform 
Act and relevant regulations provide standardized requirements that “an institution must meet in order 
to qualify to participate as skilled nursing facility in the Medicare program, and as a nursing facility 
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A. The Proposed CMS Rule Would Have Codified Certain Rights for 
LGBT Couples in Long-Term Care Facilities 
In 2014, CMS proposed a rule that would have altered certain Medicare 
participation requirements, also known as “conditions of participation,” 
for long-term care facilities that receive federal funding.89 CMS officially 
published the proposed rule in the Federal Register on December 12, 
2014.90 Prior to the proposed rule, Medicare and Medicaid requirements 
for patient’s rights provisions deferred to state law regarding the definition 
of marriage.91 
CMS stated that the purpose of the proposed rule was “to ensure that 
same-sex spouses . . . are recognized and afforded equal rights in 
Medicare and Medicaid participating facilities.”92 The proposed rule 
would have required long-term care facilities to conform to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s holding in Windsor.93 When the Court decided Windsor, 
same-sex marriage was illegal in the majority of states, and more than 
70% of states either had constitutional or statutory bans on same-sex 
marriage.94 Furthermore, under DOMA, the federal government also 
defined marriage as a “union between one man and one woman.”95 
After the Windsor ruling that DOMA was unconstitutional, the federal 
government could no longer discriminate against legally performed same-
sex marriages.96 However, the Court did not rule on the legality of state 
                                                     
in the Medicaid program.” 42 C.F.R. § 483.1(b) (2018). The regulations also state that each facility 
“must treat each resident with respect and dignity.” Id. § 483.10(a)(1). However, the Act does not 
make it illegal to discriminate against residents based on their sexual orientation. Furthermore, the 
federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, familial 
status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2012). The FHA does not expressly 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Individual states, however, may provide 
protections that the federal government does not provide. 
89. Medicare and Medicaid Program; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions of 
Participation and Conditions for Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,873 (proposed Dec. 12, 2014) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 416, 418, 482, 483, and 485). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 73,874. 
92. Id. at 73,873. 
93. Id.; see United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 771–72 (2013). Under DOMA, plaintiff Edith 
Windsor could not claim a federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses after her wife passed 
away. The IRS denied her claim because the exemption did not apply to same-sex marriages. 
However, in a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy held that “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset 
of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal,” thus violating the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 
772.  
94. Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, supra note 5 (scroll to year 2013 on the United States map). 
95. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by Windsor, 570 U.S. 744.  
96. 570 U.S. at 772. 
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laws banning same-sex marriage. Therefore, CMS’s proposed rule would 
have required Medicare and Medicaid participating long-term care 
facilities to recognize out of state same-sex marriages, even if the 
facility’s state law made them illegal.97 At the time, only seventeen states 
had legalized same-sex marriage.98 Without federal recognition, 
long-term care facilities located in states that did not recognize same-sex 
marriage could disregard a resident’s marriage, even if it was legally 
performed in another state.99 For example, under federal long-term care 
facility regulations, a resident has the right to appoint a representative who 
has decision-making power for the resident in the event of decisional 
incapacity.100 The proposed rule would have added language that 
established “a requirement that, the same-sex spouse of a resident must be 
afforded treatment equal to that afforded to an opposite-sex spouse if the 
marriage was valid in the jurisdiction in which it was celebrated.”101 
However, the proposed rule never took effect, even though CMS began 
informal notice-and-comment rulemaking.102 Following the initial 
publication of the proposed rule, the U.S. Supreme Court decided another 
landmark same-sex marriage case, Obergefell v. Hodges.103 In a 5-4 
decision, the Court held that state same-sex marriage bans violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.104 
As a result of this ruling, all fifty states must allow same-sex couples to 
obtain marriage licenses—effectively legalizing same-sex marriage 
throughout the country.105 On October 4, 2017, CMS withdrew the 
proposed rule by publishing a formal notice of withdrawal in the Federal 
Register.106 In the notice, CMS cited only one reason for the agency’s 
                                                     
97. Medicare and Medicaid Program; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions of 
Participation and Conditions for Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,873 (proposed Dec. 12, 2014) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 416, 418, 482, 483, and 485). 
98. Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, supra note 5.  
99. Medicare and Medicaid Program; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions of 
Participation and Conditions for Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. at 73,874. 
100. Id. at 73,875. 
101. Id. 
102. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions for 
Participation and Conditions for Coverage; Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,181 (withdrawn Oct. 4, 
2017). 
103. 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
104. Id. at 2604–05; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
105. Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, supra note 5. 
106. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions for 
Participation and Conditions for Coverage; Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. at 46,181. 
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decision to withdrawal the proposed rule, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Obergefell.107 
Considering Obergefell’s impact on the proposed rule, CMS reasoned 
that the landmark decision “addressed many of the concerns raised in the 
December 2014 proposed rule.”108 CMS stated that “the Supreme Court 
held that the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people of 
the same-sex, and to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed in 
other States.”109 Thus, the proposed rule was no longer needed because 
Obergefell accomplished the same goal. 
B. The Obergefell Ruling Does Not Provide LGBT Older Adults 
Added Protection Beyond Marriage Recognition 
In January 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to a group 
of cases from the Sixth Circuit that upheld the same-sex marriage bans of 
four states: Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee.110 The 
consolidated case, Obergefell v. Hodges, provided an opportunity for the 
U.S. Supreme Court to define sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect class 
for the first time.111 The plaintiffs sought to answer the question of 
whether the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment required states to include same-sex couples 
within the definition of marriage.112 
Leading up to this landmark case, three competing theories existed as 
to how the U.S. Supreme Court would handle the classification of sexual 
orientation as a quasi-suspect class within the Equal Protection tiers of 
scrutiny.113 The first theory suggested that the Court could have struck 
down the same-sex marriage ban without declaring sexual orientation a 
                                                     
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Obergefell v. Hodges, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015) (mem.); DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 
F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.  
111. But cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (refusing to define 
mental disability as a quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis). The U.S. Supreme 
Court “has extended suspect status to classifications based on national origin and alienage in addition 
to those based on race.” Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of Discriminatory Intent: A New Model, 90 
YALE L.J. 912, 915 (1981). See id. Quasi-suspect status is afforded to “classifications based on 
gender.” Suspect and quasi-suspect classifications trigger different levels of scrutiny. Id. 
112. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 399.  
113. Maxwell L. Stearns, Obergefell, Fisher, and the Inversion of Tiers, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1043, 1046 (2017). 
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quasi-suspect class by solely relying on an animus theory.114 The animus 
theory, which resides within rational basis review, is grounded within 
demonstrated animus towards a “politically unpopular group.”115 The 
second theory would have treated sexual orientation as a form of gender-
based discrimination, thereby placing it within the intermediate tier of 
scrutiny.116 The third theory relied on equating same-sex marriage to 
anti-miscegenation laws, thus placing the analysis within the strict 
scrutiny tier.117 
In Obergefell, however, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case in a 
manner that avoided the tiers of Equal Protection altogether. Instead, the 
Court’s analysis rested on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
clause.118 The Court determined that marriage is a fundamental right held 
within Due Process’s promise of liberty.119 Resting the decision on the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause creates a narrow holding.120 
“Because Obergefell was laser focused on the fundamental right to marry 
and not the nature of the classification, . . . future courts can easily 
distinguish Obergefell.”121 Even though Obergefell legalized same-sex 
marriage in all fifty states, LGBT people are still left without the 
protection of a suspect class.122 Without this protection, LGBT older 
adults in federal and state funded long-term care facilities lack the ability 
to fully challenge discrimination based upon their sexual orientation.  
III. THE HURDLES IN CHALLENGING WITHDRAWN 
PROPOSED RULES 
This Part discusses judicial review of withdrawn discretionary 
proposed rules and the lens through which courts review the agency’s 
reasoning behind such withdrawals. It outlines the prevailing viewpoint 
                                                     
114. Id. at 1101. 
115. Id. at 1058; see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Colorado’s Amendment 
2 to the state constitution prohibiting sexual orientation from inclusion in state antidiscrimination laws 
under animus rationale). 
116. Stearns, supra note 113, at 1101. 
117. Id. 
118. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
119. Id. at 2591. 
120. Peter Nicolas, Obergefell’s Squandered Potential, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 137, 142 (2015) 
(“The Court’s failure to declare sexual orientation a suspect classification has resulted in concrete 
harm to gays and lesbians . . . . [L]ower courts have repeatedly upheld laws discriminating on the 
basis of sexual orientation.”). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
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of the D.C. Circuit—that withdrawn discretionary proposed rules are 
judicially reviewable if certain conditions are fulfilled. This Part also 
discusses the dissenting viewpoints to judicial review, primarily former 
Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski’s criticism of the D.C. Circuit’s 
approach. Specifically, Judge Kozinski finds that the D.C. Circuit’s 
approach contravenes the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler v. 
Chaney.123 Lastly, this Part explains the APA’s arbitrary and capricious 
review standard and how it applies to withdrawn discretionary proposed 
rules. 
A. Withdrawn Discretionary Proposed Rules Are Reviewable If 
Certain Criteria Are Satisfied 
As previously discussed, there are three categories of withdrawn 
proposed rules.124 Judicial review of the first two categories remains 
unquestioned.125 However, the third category of withdrawn proposed rules 
are creatures of agency discretion and provide a unique challenge to 
judicial review for several reasons.126 First, this agency action is not 
mandated or explicitly contemplated by the governing organic statute.127 
Second, on its face, the text of the APA bars judicial review of 
discretionary actions, unlike those that are required by statute.128 Lastly, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has remained silent on the reviewability of 
discretionary withdrawals. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized that the APA should generally be read to cover a broad range 
of agency action and that the judicial review sections should be read in a 
“hospitable” manner.129 
In the absence of a U.S. Supreme Court decision, the D.C. Circuit has 
held that withdrawn discretionary proposed rules are nonetheless 
reviewable.130 The D.C. Circuit’s precedent has sharply diverted from the 
actual text of the APA, which states that actions reserved to an agency’s 
discretion are not reviewable by the judicial branch.131 
                                                     
123. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
124. See supra Part I. 
125. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1189–90; see supra section I.C. 
126. Id. at 1190. 
127. Id. 
128. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012). 
129. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967), abrogated on other grounds, Califano 
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
130. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
131. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
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The most extensive analysis of the D.C. Circuit’s view of withdrawn 
discretionary proposed rules appears in Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. SEC.132 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) withdrew “proposed disclosure rules” after a substantial notice-
and-comment period, including “nineteen days of public hearings.”133 On 
appeal, the SEC argued that the district court “erred because the SEC’s 
decision not to adopt rules was nonreviewable.”134 The SEC relied 
exclusively on section 701(a)(2) of the APA to make a textual argument 
that discretionary actions by agencies are not reviewable.135 The D.C. 
Circuit disagreed, rejecting the SEC’s argument and stating that 
section 701(a)(2) “creates a strong presumption of reviewability that can 
only be rebutted by a clear showing that judicial review would be 
inappropriate.”136 
Even though the D.C. Circuit held that section 701(a)(2) creates a 
presumption of reviewability,137 the court of appeals refused to issue a per 
se rule.138 Rather, the D.C. Circuit cautioned that review of withdrawn 
discretionary proposed rules will not be proper in every case.139 Thus, 
courts must balance an agency’s expertise with section 701(a)(2)’s 
presumption of reviewability.140 
In light of this balance, the D.C. Circuit created two procedural hurdles 
that a withdrawal must satisfy for a reviewing court to determine if the 
agency correctly withdrew the proposed rule.141 First, the withdrawal must 
signal the completion of the agency’s regulatory process; the action must 
represent the agency’s determination that it will not tinker with the 
proposed issue further.142 The agency is often in the best position to 
discern “internal management considerations as to budget and personnel; 
evaluations of its own competence; weighing of competing policies within 
a broad statutory framework.”143 Similarly, the agency is also the best 
                                                     
132. 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
133. Id. at 1037–39. 
134. Id. at 1043. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 1047. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 1046–47. 
141. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1192. 
142. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 710 F.2d 842, 847–48 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983). 
143. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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party to determine whether the timing is right to promulgate a new rule.144 
Second, the reviewing court needs to assess a sufficient record 
documenting the agency’s decision.145 Thus, in Natural Resources 
Defense Council, review of the withdrawn proposed rule was proper 
because the SEC held “extensive rulemaking proceedings narrowly 
focused on the particular rules at issue, and [had] explained in detail its 
reasons for not adopting those rules . . . .”146 In sum, the D.C. Circuit has 
ultimately furnished an amorphous standard where review is proper if “the 
agency has in fact held a rulemaking proceeding and compiled a record 
narrowly focused on the particular rules suggested but not adopted.”147 
Even if a withdrawal of a proposed rule is concrete and specific enough 
to surpass the D.C. Circuit’s hurdles to review, the court of appeals will 
give an immense amount of deference to the agency’s decision to 
withdraw.148 Deference is given because “[t]he whole point of notice-and-
comment rulemaking, after all, is that the comments which the agency 
receives may induce it to abandon or modify its initial views.”149 Because 
of the unique procedural posture of withdrawn discretionary proposed 
rules, the D.C. Circuit will “give more deference to an agency’s decision 
to withdraw a proposed rule than we give to its decision to promulgate a 
new rule or to rescind an existing one.”150 However, an agency will not 
receive unlimited deference because the notice of a proposed rule 
“oblige[s] the agency to consider the comments it received and to 
articulate a reasoned explanation for its decision.”151 Thus, the D.C. 
Circuit has articulated the following standard: an agency cannot 
“terminate . . . rulemaking for no reason whatsoever.”152 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit appeared to be in lockstep with the 
D.C. Circuit on the reviewability of withdrawn discretionary proposed 
rules.153 In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman,154 several animal 
                                                     
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 1046–47. 
146. Id. at 1047. 
147. Id. 
148. Williams Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 872 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). 
149. Id. at 446. 
150. United Mine Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 358 F.3d 40, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also 
Williams Nat. Gas Co., 872 F.2d at 443–44. 
151. Williams Nat. Gas Co., 872 F.2d. at 450. 
152. Id. at 446. 
153. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman (Veneman I), 469 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated 
en banc, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007). 
154. 469 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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welfare organizations sued the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
for its decision not to adopt a “Draft Policy” that would have provided 
guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other similar entities for “how to 
ensure the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates in order to 
comply with the Animal Welfare Act (AWA).”155 The Draft Policy 
remained a draft for three years until the USDA’s Deputy Administrator 
for Animal Care announced that USDA was withdrawing the action.156 
The plaintiffs challenged the decision to withdraw the Draft Policy as 
arbitrary and capricious.157 
Initially, the Ninth Circuit relied on the D.C. Circuit case, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, to summarize the two-step process for 
reviewing the withdrawal of proposed discretionary rules. First, “[t]he 
agency must ‘have held a rulemaking proceeding.’”158 Second, the agency 
“must have ‘compiled a record narrowly focused on the particular rules 
suggested but not adopted.’”159 The Ninth Circuit determined that 
USDA’s actions satisfied the two-step process and remanded the case 
back to the district court to determine whether the decision to withdraw 
was arbitrary and capricious.160 The Ninth Circuit’s decision, however, 
was eventually overturned and vacated en banc.161 
B. The Reviewability of Withdrawn Discretionary Proposed Rules in 
Light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Heckler v. Chaney 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Natural Resources Defense Council 
predates the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Heckler v. Chaney. 
Heckler determined certain discretionary actions by an agency are 
unreviewable.162 In Heckler, the respondents had been sentenced to death 
“by lethal injection of drugs under the laws of the States of Oklahoma and 
Texas.”163 Respondents argued that the specific lethal injection drugs had 
not been approved for use on humans.164 Despite this contention, the FDA 
refused to take “various investigatory and enforcement actions” to prevent 
                                                     
155. Id. at 829. 
156. Id. at 831. 
157. Id. at 829. 
158. Id. at 843 (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 844. 
161. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman (Veneman II), 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007). 
162. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985). 
163. Id. at 823. 
164. Id. 
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the perceived violations of the FDA.165 Therefore, the respondents filed 
suit seeking to compel the FDA to undertake adjudicatory procedures.166 
The Court acknowledged that section 701(a)(2) of the APA and case 
precedent dictated a presumption of reviewability.167 However, that 
presumption did not apply to an agency’s decision to pursue discretionary 
enforcement actions.168 
The Court stated that agencies, not the courts, are better equipped to 
sift through the numerous variables associated with whether an agency 
should pursue enforcement actions.169 This agency decision, the Court 
held, “involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are 
peculiarly within its expertise.”170 Furthermore, the Court noted that when 
an agency chooses not to pursue enforcement actions, “it generally does 
not exercise its coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property 
rights.”171 However, when an agency chooses to act, “that action itself 
provides a focus for judicial review.”172 Thus, the reviewing court is better 
able to assess whether “the agency exceeded its statutory powers.”173 The 
Court cautioned that discretionary enforcement action is only 
presumptively unreviewable.174 Moreover, the Court also made it quite 
clear that it was not deciding the reviewability of discretionary 
rulemaking.175 
Former Judge Alex Kozinski, in a recent Ninth Circuit opinion,176 
dissented from the Veneman I majority’s decision to review the USDA’s 
withdrawn Draft Policy.177 He argued vigorously in favor of the non-
                                                     
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 830–31.  
168. Id. at 831. 
169. Id. at 831–32 (“Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but 
whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to 
succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall 
policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all. An 
agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with 
enforcing.”). 
170. Id. at 831. 
171. Id. at 832. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 825 n.2, 831–32. 
176. Veneman I, 469 F.3d 826, 844 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), vacated en banc, 490 
F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007). 
177. Id. 
17 - Carmody.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2018  4:31 PM 
2018] REVIEWING WITHDRAWN PROPOSED RULES 2127 
 
reviewable nature of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules because of 
Heckler.178 He argued that Heckler rung in a new era of administrative law 
in which courts should refrain from reviewing certain discretionary 
agency actions.179 Judge Kozinski believed his colleagues were stretching 
the bounds of reviewability under the APA: “[i]n holding that we can 
review withdrawal of proposed regulations an agency had no duty to 
adopt, my colleagues overlook the sea-change in administrative law 
wrought by Heckler v. Chaney, which held that we have no authority to 
review an agency’s discretionary decision not to act.”180 
For Judge Kozinski, Heckler’s holding sweeps broadly. Even though 
the holding in Heckler did not apply to agency rulemaking, Judge 
Kozinski argues that the same sentiments should apply to regulations 
regardless because they “implicate precisely the same concerns addressed 
in [Heckler].”181 He warned that the Veneman I majority and the D.C. 
Circuit’s approach discourages agencies from engaging in discretionary 
rulemaking “lest they be stuck with them if they cannot convince a federal 
court that the record supports abandonment.”182 This expansion, Judge 
Kozinski argues, completely disregards U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
and cannot stand.183 
1. Massachusetts v. EPA Highlights That Heckler v. Chaney Does 
Not Apply to Every Discretionary Agency Action 
As discussed above, the APA generally does not allow a court to review 
discretionary agency action.184 Furthermore, in Heckler, the U.S. Supreme 
Court made it clear that an agency’s decision not to bring enforcement 
action is presumptively unreviewable.185 In its 2007 decision, 
Massachusetts v. EPA,186 the Court addressed judicial review of agency 
inaction again.187 This case, however, presented a different regulatory 
posture; the Court was tasked with reviewing the EPA’s denial of a 
                                                     
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. (emphasis in original). 
181. Id. at 849. 
182. Id. at 850. 
183. Id. at 853. 
184. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012). 
185. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985). 
186. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
187. Id. at 511. 
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petition for rulemaking.188 In deciding the case, the Court answered two 
questions: (1) “whether EPA has the statutory authority to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions,”189 and (2) “whether its stated reasons for 
refusing to do so are consistent with the statute.”190 
In October 1999, nineteen private organizations filed a petition for 
rulemaking with the EPA.191 The organizations asked the EPA to regulate 
“greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under § 202 of the 
Clean Air Act.”192 Fifteen months after the request, the EPA opened 
public comment for all issues relating to the organizations’ petition.193 
Over the next five months, the EPA received over 50,000 comments 
relating to the petition.194 In 2003, the EPA entered an order denying the 
petition for rulemaking.195 In denying the petition for rulemaking, the EPA 
stated that the “Clean Air Act does not authorize [the] EPA to issue 
mandatory regulations to address global climate change” and “that even 
if the Agency had the authority . . . it would be unwise to do so at this 
time.”196 
After a lengthy discussion of standing, the Court noted that “an agency 
has broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources 
and personnel to carry out its delegated responsibilities.”197 The Court 
referenced its decision in Heckler to affirm the notion that agency 
“discretion is at its height when [it] decides not to bring an enforcement 
action.”198 The Court noted, however, that there are “key differences” 
between an agency denial of a petition for rulemaking and a denial of 
enforcement,199 and thus refused to extend Heckler’s presumption of 
unreviewability.200 Even though the Court did not extend Heckler, it 
limited Heckler’s holding and noted that review of petition denials would 
                                                     
188. Id. 
189. Id.  
190. Id.  
191. Id. at 510. 
192. Id.  
193. Id. at 511.  
194. Id.; see Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 
52,924 (denied petition for rulemaking Sept. 8, 2003). 
195. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511.  
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 527. 
198. Id. 
199. Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies 
Defer Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157, 173 (2014). 
200. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 527–28. 
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be “extremely limited” and “highly deferential.”201 The Court found that 
judicial review of denials of petitions for rulemaking “are less frequent, 
more apt to involve legal as opposed to factual analysis, and subject to 
special formalities, including a public explanation.”202 
The Court ultimately held that the EPA’s reasoning for denying the 
petition for rulemaking could not stand.203 The Court determined that the 
Clean Air Act did in fact contemplate the regulation of greenhouse 
gases.204 The EPA argued various reasons why regulation was not proper, 
but for the Court, those reasons missed the mark.205 For example, the EPA 
noted that the regulation “might impair the President’s ability to negotiate 
with ‘key developing nations’ to reduce emissions,” and that regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions would be “inefficient” and “piecemeal.”206 
The Court found that EPA’s reasons did not support its decision to deny 
the petition for rulemaking.207 The EPA could not avoid statutory 
obligations “by noting the uncertainty surrounding various features of 
climate change and concluding that it would therefore be better not to 
regulate at this time.”208 The Court stated that if the “scientific uncertainty 
[was] so profound that it precludes [the] EPA from making a reasoned 
judgment . . . [the] EPA must say so.”209 
C. An Agency Must Satisfy the APA’s Arbitrary and Capricious 
Standard in Order to Successfully Withdraw a Proposed Rule 
If a withdrawn discretionary proposed rule satisfies the D.C. Circuit’s 
two-step reviewability standard, a court will review the agency’s 
reasoning under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious review standard.210 
To survive arbitrary and capricious review, the agency’s reasoning must 
be sufficiently definite because it provides the only window into the 
agency’s decision to withdraw the rule.211 The U.S. Supreme Court used 
                                                     
201. Id.  
202. Id. at 527 (quoting Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
203. Id. at 534. 
204. Id. at 532. 
205. Id. at 533. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 534. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. (emphasis added); see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
210. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
211. See Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196. 
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this standard to review the EPA’s reasoning in Massachusetts v. EPA.212 
The following sections describe the boundaries of the arbitrary and 
capricious review standard and what is required of an agency to 
adequately withdraw a proposed rule. 
1. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard and Judicial Review of 
Agency Action 
The APA requires courts to set aside “agency action, findings, and 
conclusions” if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with [the] law.”213 The landmark decision 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual 
Auto Insurance Co.214 established certain guidelines for the arbitrary and 
capricious standard. In State Farm, the Court reviewed the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration decision to rescind a Department 
of Transportation requirement “that new motor vehicles produced after 
September 1982 be equipped with passive restraints to protect the safety 
of the [passengers].”215 The Court reviewed the agency’s decision under 
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.216 
Arbitrary and capricious review is a relatively narrow and limited 
judicial tool because reviewing courts cannot substitute their own 
judgment for an agency’s decision.217 Consequently, courts are 
constrained to reviewing only the agency record or the agency’s 
reasoning.218 This limited review prevents agencies from constructing 
post-hoc rationalizations to explain its decisions.219 Moreover, in 
providing an adequate reason, an “agency must examine the relevant data 
and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”220 The agency 
must rely on “relevant factors”221 and the court will consider if the agency 
                                                     
212. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534. 
213. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
214. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
215. Id. at 34. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 43; Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971). 
218. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
219. Id. 
220. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 
168 (1962)). 
221. Id. 
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has made a “clear error in judgement.”222 Typically an agency decision 
will be arbitrary and capricious if it: 
[R]elied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation . . . that runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.223 
Arbitrary and capricious review is often referred to as a “hard look”224 
that relies on “statutory, factual, scientific, or otherwise technocratic 
terms.”225 The back and forth of politics “cannot properly help to explain 
administrative action for purposes of arbitrary and capricious review.”226 
Even if politics play a role in the background of an agency’s motivation 
for action and reasoning, arbitrary and capricious review commands an 
agency to explain its reasoning in technocratic and factual terms.227 
2. The Application of Arbitrary and Capricious Review to Withdrawn 
Discretionary Proposed Rules 
The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly stated that it will review withdrawn 
discretionary proposed rules through an extremely deferential lens, even 
more so than it would for other agency actions, such as the “promulgation 
of . . . new rule[s].”228 The D.C. Circuit applies such a deferential standard 
because withdrawn discretionary proposed rules do not alter the 
“regulatory status quo.”229 In contrast, when an agency promulgates a new 
rule, however, it should receive a more exacting review.230 Thus, an 
agency must give “a more persuasive justification” for promulgating new 
rules “than [it] does [for] the decision to retain an existing rule.”231 
The D.C. Circuit has made it clear that it is not advocating for a 
different standard of arbitrary and capricious review in regards to 
                                                     
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 
YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2009). 
225. Id. at 2. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Williams Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 872 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
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withdrawals of discretionary proposed rules.232 The court “simply note[s] 
that [its] application of the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard must be 
informed by our recognition that an agency’s decision to retain the status 
quo may be more easily defensible than a shift in policy would be.”233 In 
sum, the D.C. Circuit relies on the APA’s arbitrary and capricious 
standard to guide review of an agency’s reasons for a withdrawal, but it 
will also give an extra deferential nod to the agency’s decision.234 
In 2004, the D.C. Circuit directly addressed its current view of the 
arbitrary and capricious review standard for withdrawn discretionary 
proposed rules.235 In United Mine Workers v. U.S. Department of 
Labor,236 the D.C. Circuit held that the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration’s (MSHA) decision to withdraw a proposed rule was 
arbitrary and capricious.237 The 1989 proposed rule would have 
established certain permissible exposure limits “for more than 600 
chemical substances that might be present in a mine.”238 After the notice-
and-comment period, which included several public hearings, MSHA 
withdrew the proposed rule.239 In withdrawing the rule, MSHA reasoned 
that “changes in agency priorities” along with “the possible adverse 
effect . . . of the decision in AFL-CIO v. OSHA, in which the Eleventh 
Circuit had invalidated an [Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration] rule that set new [permissible exposure limits] for 428 
toxic substances” ultimately made the proposed rule useless.240 MSHA 
also indicated that it had been “more than 13 years since the proposal was 
published and more than 12 years since the comments were received.”241 
The agency gave three potential reasons for the D.C. Circuit to review, 
none of which passed arbitrary and capricious review.242 The D.C. Circuit 
held that merely stating a “change in agency priorities” does not and 
cannot guide a reviewing court because it is “merely a reiteration of the 
                                                     
232. Id. at 444. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 443. 
235. United Mine Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 358 F.3d 40, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
236. 358 F.3d 40 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 41. 
239. Id. at 42. 
240. Id.; Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 986–87 (11th Cir. 
1992). 
241. United Mine Workers, 358 F.3d at 42 (quoting Air Quality Chemical Substances and 
Respiratory Standards, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,611, 60,611 (Sept. 26, 2002)). 
242. Id. at 44. 
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decision to withdraw the proposed rule.”243 The amount of time that 
passed between proposing the rule and the withdrawal is a reason to 
hesitate before promulgating, but “not for abandoning altogether.”244 
Lastly, MSHA gave no explanation for why AFL-CIO v. OSHA245 was 
“fatal” to the proposed rule.246 Thus, the D.C. Circuit sent it back to the 
agency to “either proceed with the . . . rulemaking or give a reasoned 
account of its decision not to do so.”247 
IV. WITHDRAWN DISCRETIONARY PROPOSED RULES 
SHOULD BE REVIEWABLE UNDER THE APA’S 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD 
In sum, even though the 2014 proposed CMS rule may not have added 
sweeping protections for LGBT older adults in long-term care facilities, 
the subsequent withdrawal of the proposed rule by the Trump 
Administration highlights an uncertain and evolving area of 
administrative law. The proposed CMS rule falls into the third category 
of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules—representing both agency 
action and inaction. The proposed CMS rule also highlights how, even 
after considerable resources are expended for a rule proposal, agencies 
can summarily withdraw the proposed rule with little explanation. 
Furthermore, whether judicial review of an agency’s reasoning for a 
withdrawal is proper remains on uncertain ground. 
The uncertainty surrounding judicial review of withdrawn proposed 
agency rules stems from the U.S. Supreme Court’s silence. The D.C. 
Circuit, however, has held that withdrawn proposed rules are reviewable 
if certain requirements are met.248 Beyond the D.C. Circuit, some judges 
argue that reviewing withdrawn discretionary proposed rules contravenes 
Heckler v. Chaney,249 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts 
cannot review an agency’s discretionary non-enforcement decision.250 
If, however, a withdrawn discretionary proposed rule fulfills the D.C. 
Circuit’s reviewability requirements, the court of appeals utilizes the 
                                                     
243. Id.  
244. Id. 
245. 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992). 
246. United Mine Workers, 358 F.3d at 44. 
247. Id. at 45. 
248. Id. at 43–44; Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
249. Veneman I, 469 F.3d 826, 844 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), vacated en banc, 490 
F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007). 
250. 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985). 
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APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, unless the organic act specifies 
otherwise.251 In doing so, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly stated that 
withdrawn discretionary proposed rules receive enhanced deference, but 
not an expanded arbitrary and capricious review.252 Thus, the D.C. Circuit 
will give more deference to an agency’s decision to withdraw a proposed 
rule than it would give to an agency’s decision to promulgate a rule.253 
A. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Is the Appropriate Judicial 
Review Mechanism to Review Withdrawn Discretionary Proposed 
Rules 
A withdrawn discretionary proposed rule properly before a court 
contains all the necessary pieces for arbitrary and capricious review. The 
D.C. Circuit’s threshold question for reviewability simply asks whether 
the APA’s process of informal rulemaking has been implemented and to 
what extent.254 A withdrawn proposed rule may signal final agency action, 
and through notice-and-comment rulemaking, an agency has likely 
created an extensive enough record for a reviewing court to adequately 
assess an agency’s reasoning.255 Thus, the holding in Heckler v. Chaney 
should not extend to withdrawn discretionary proposed rules because, 
unlike an agency’s decision not to enforce, a withdrawn proposed rule 
contains an adequate record to assess the agency’s reasoning. 
Judge Kozinski, however, argues the opposite—Heckler forecloses 
judicial review of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules.256 
Furthermore, Judge Kozinski argues that the D.C. Circuit’s precedent will 
have a chilling effect on informal rulemaking.257 Under his view, agencies 
hesitate before launching into the informal rulemaking process as to avoid 
ending up with a discretionary rule that they no longer need or want.258 
                                                     
251. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(A) (2012); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
252. Williams Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 872 F.2d 438, 443–44 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). 
253. Id. 
254. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that review 
of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules is proper when “the agency has in fact held extensive 
rulemaking proceedings narrowly focused on the particular rules at issue, and has explained in detail 
its reasons for not adopting those rules”). 
255. Williams Nat. Gas Co., 872 F.2d at 443. 
256. Veneman I, 469 F.3d 826, 844 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), vacated en banc, 490 
F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007). 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
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While Judge Kozinski correctly highlights that informal rulemaking 
involves varying levels of discretion and expertise, the informal 
rulemaking process and the abandonment thereof provides sufficient 
bounds and specificity for judicial review. Informal notice-and-comment 
rulemaking contains several procedural boundaries to ensure the creation 
of an adequate record.259 Discretion in agency enforcement, such as when 
or how to enforce, does not contain similar bounds,260 thus making review 
more difficult and inaccurate. 
The Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. EPA further supports the 
reviewability of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules, even though the 
case was grounded in a different type of agency action. Withdrawn 
discretionary proposed rules have more procedural backing within the 
APA than what is required for a denial of a petition for rulemaking.261 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking ensures a specific process from which 
agencies are not allowed to deviate.262 For example, an agency must 
publish a “statement of their basis and purpose” for every proposed rule, 
thus when an agency decides to formally withdrawal such a rule, the 
agency must provide a reason that satisfies the arbitrary and capricious 
standard.263 Withdrawing proposed rules involves significant agency 
discretion, but it also involves a highly standardized process that includes 
the creation of a detailed record. Judicial review of these withdrawals 
ensures that agencies are not abusing the significant discretion allotted to 
them by Congress. 
B. Arbitrary and Capricious Review Ensures Reasoned and Measured 
Agency Decision-Making 
Arbitrary and capricious review requires an agency to provide adequate 
reasoning for agency action. The standard requires a logical connection 
between the rationale and the action itself.264 This highly deferential 
standard is a relatively low bar, as the standard recognizes that agency 
discretion is often rooted in agency expertise and it is not appropriate for 
courts to usurp an agency’s reasoned decision.265 Thus, arbitrary and 
capricious review ensures a minimum standard of reasoned 
                                                     
259. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012). 
260. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830–31 (1985). 
261. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c), with 5 U.S.C § 553(e).  
262. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1)–(3); Beerman & Lawson, supra note 40, at 856. 
263. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
264. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
265. See id. 
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decision-making in two ways. First, arbitrary and capricious review forces 
agencies to provide adequate reasons to support their decisions.266 Second, 
arbitrary and capricious review ensures that reviewing courts have an 
adequate record to review an agency’s reason and that the record logically 
connects to the agency’s decision.267 U.S. Supreme Court precedent has 
firmly established that a reviewing court can assess only what was 
provided in the record.268 This precedent securely tethers arbitrary and 
capricious review as a manageable standard.269 
Judge Kozinski’s concerns with unfettered judicial review of agency 
discretion are cured through the D.C. Circuit’s already highly deferential 
standard given to agencies when withdrawing a proposed rule. The D.C. 
Circuit has repeatedly stated that it will give more deference in reviewing 
withdrawn discretionary proposed rules than it would accord to a final 
promulgation of a rule, while not expanding the arbitrary and capricious 
review standard.270 
For example, the withdrawn proposed CMS rule would likely survive 
arbitrary and capricious review if challenged. CMS stated that there was 
no longer a need for the proposed rule due to the holding in Obergefell.271 
Like the court in United Mine Workers of America, a reviewing court 
would assess whether CMS adequately explained why Obergefell moots 
the need for the proposed rule.272 In the published withdrawal, CMS noted 
that Obergefell “requires a state to license a marriage between two people 
of the same sex, and to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed 
                                                     
266. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1947) (requiring agencies to provide a reason for 
their actions so that courts are adequately prepared to review such decisions and finding that a court 
cannot supplement its own judgement for what the agency did).  
267. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971) (remanding 
because the lower court did not adequately review the full administrative record). 
268. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 94. 
269. Id. 
270. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 358 F.3d 40, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“In 
applying this standard, we give more deference to an agency’s decision to withdraw a proposed rule 
than we give to its decision to promulgate a new rule or to rescind an existing one.”); Williams Nat. 
Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 872 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“At the same time, 
however, we believe that the agency’s termination of a rulemaking should be reviewed somewhat 
more deferentially than would its promulgation of a new rule.”); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 
606 F.2d 1031, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Thus, the considerations that counsel against judicial review 
of a decision not to adopt rules by informal rulemaking also call for us, when we do review, to exercise 
special deference.”). 
271. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions for 
Participation and Conditions for Coverage; Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,181, 46,181 (withdrawn Oct. 
4, 2017). 
272. United Mine Workers, 358 F.3d at 44. 
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in other States.”273 It is true that Obergefell requires states to recognize all 
lawfully performed same-sex marriages, thus the withdrawal likely 
survives the already deferential arbitrary and capricious review standard. 
The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly stated that it will use arbitrary and 
capricious review, but it has also established the agency cannot 
“terminate . . . rulemaking for no reason whatsoever.”274 
Judicial review of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules simply 
ensures that agencies are not abandoning the rulemaking process for 
completely arbitrary reasons. Thus, arbitrary and capricious review serves 
as a perfectly adequate tool to compel reasoned decision-making in 
withdrawing a proposed rule. Furthermore, the bulk of withdrawn 
discretionary proposed rules are likely to come at times when political 
interests may serve as the true motivating force for action.275 Therefore, 
this standard guarantees that agencies are not abusing their discretionary 
power and withdrawing proposed rules for arbitrary reasons. 
CONCLUSION 
The 2017 withdrawal of an Obama Administration proposed rule 
highlights an unsettled area of administrative law. The proposed CMS rule 
attempted to provide legal protection for same-sex spouses in the wake of 
the Windsor decision. However, even though the CMS rule garnered 
ninety-four comments over the course of three years, the agency 
ultimately decided to withdraw it. In its withdrawal reasoning, CMS stated 
that the Obergefell decision provided what the rule sought to achieve, 
therefore the rule was unnecessary. 
This Comment argues that withdrawn discretionary proposed rules 
should be subject to judicial review. In reviewing withdrawn discretionary 
proposed rules, the D.C. Circuit examines an agency’s reasoning under 
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. In doing so, the D.C. Circuit 
has repeatedly stated that it will give enhanced deference to withdrawn 
rules than if the agency promulgated a new rule or rescinded an old rule. 
Outside the D.C. Circuit, the reviewability of withdrawn discretionary 
proposed rules is less certain. Former Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski argues 
that withdrawn discretionary proposed rules should not be reviewable 
because of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Heckler. However, 
informal rulemaking initiates a different mechanism under the APA, 
which provides adequate structures and procedures for the creation of an 
                                                     
273. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions for 
Participation and Conditions for Coverage; Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. at 46,181.  
274. Williams Nat. Gas Co., 872 F.2d at 450. 
275. See Watts, supra note 224, at 70–71. 
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administrative record. Withdrawn discretionary proposed rules should be 
reviewable under the APA because the arbitrary and capricious standard 
ensures reasoned agency decision-making and prevents abuse of power. 
 
